Dynamic Modeling of the Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack Using a Radiological Dispersion Device by Ledford, Christopher B.
Air Force Institute of Technology 
AFIT Scholar 
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 
3-20-2009 
Dynamic Modeling of the Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack 
Using a Radiological Dispersion Device 
Christopher B. Ledford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd 
 Part of the Terrorism Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ledford, Christopher B., "Dynamic Modeling of the Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack Using a 
Radiological Dispersion Device" (2009). Theses and Dissertations. 2589. 
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2589 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more 
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu. 
 
 
 
Cover, Single-Author Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DYNAMIC MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK USING 
A RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE 
 
THESIS 
 
Christopher B. Ledford, Captain, USAF 
AFIT/GEM/ENV/09-M07 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample 3.  Disclaimer Statement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United 
States Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 
AFIT/GEM/ENV/09-M07 
 
 
 
 
 DYNAMIC MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST 
ATTACK USING A RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty 
 
Department of Systems and Engineering Management 
 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
 
Air University 
 
Air Education and Training Command 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
 
Degree of Master of Science in Engineering and Environmental Management 
 
 
 
 
Christopher B. Ledford, BS 
 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
March 2009 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
AFIT/GEM/ENV/09-M07   
 
 
 
 
 
DYNAMIC MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST 
ATTACK USING A RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE 
 
 
 
 
 
Christopher B. Ledford, BS 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Approved: 
 
 
 ----signed------      20 Mar 09 
___________________________________      
 David Smith, LtCol, PhD, USAF (Chairman)  Date 
   
 ----signed-----       6 Mar 09 
 ___________________________________      
Michael Shelly, PhD (Member)    Date 
 
 ----signed------      6 Mar 09 
 ___________________________________      
 Dean Vitale, LtCol, PhD, USAF (Member)   Date 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample 7.  MS Thesis Approval Page 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
AFIT/GEM/ENV/09-M07 
Abstract 
 
  The purpose of this research is to model the dynamic economic influences 
associated with an attack using a radiological dispersion device (RDD).  Specifically, this 
thesis seeks to identify the variables associated with the total economic impact to the 
local community where the attack occurs and gain better insights into how local, state and 
federal entities can employ various policy decisions to bring the system under control 
within the first year of recovery.  Of primary interest to the research is the problematic 
behavior of exponential economic impact and how the final accumulation of fiscal cost 
can be reduced.  Using a system dynamics research method and the dynamic modeling 
software STELLA©, considerations such as controlling the media’s influence on public 
fear, consumer confidence, community resilience, and community recovery are 
incorporated with fiscal impact stocks such as business losses, tax revenue losses, and 
response costs.  Once combined, the model uses historical examples of responses from 
the September 11 attacks, the Three Mile Island and Goiania, Brazil incidents, natural 
disasters, and recommendations from the latest Environmental Protection Agency 
Protective Action Guidance for response to radiological incidents to examine the effect 
on the impacted community’s recovery and total fiscal impact. 
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DYNAMIC MODELING OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK 
USING A RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSION DEVICE 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background 
 
 Since September 11, 2001, the United States has diligently prepared for all likely 
scenarios of terrorist attack.  The common modus operandi of notorious Islamic terrorist 
organizations is the use of conventional weapons and explosives.  However, the desire for 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is well documented.  Al Qaeda specifically has searched 
for nuclear weapons, nuclear material, and the technical personnel required to create an 
improvised nuclear device (IND) or radiological dispersion device (RDD) since the early 1990s. 
(Boureston, 2002)  Osama bin Laden and Muslim clerics have declared that the acquisition of 
WMDs is a religious duty for jihadist around the world in hopes that the ability to strike the 
United States with such a weapon becomes a reality.  The availability of weapons grade fissile 
material is limited for a non-state entity, but radioactive material such as Cesium 137 is 
commonly found in less secure industrial or medical facilities.  Consequently, it is more likely 
that terrorists will create an RDD or “dirty bomb” From these less secure sources.  This concern 
has become the premiere fear of Homeland Security personnel.  This fear was publically 
highlighted in a press conference hosted by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, in 
which he stated, “As I think I have said previously, the single biggest threat we worry about, in 
terms of protecting this country and securing the homeland, is the threat of a weapon of mass 
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destruction.  And at the very top of the scale is a nuclear device or a radiological device.” 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2006) 
Problem Statement 
It is generally accepted that the psychological effects from an RDD on the populace 
located near the attack are likely to impact the economy through fear.  Economists, government 
personnel, and scholars have attempted to quantify the economic impacts of such an attack.  
Unfortunately, there is no definitive methodology for how to quantify the economic impact of 
such an event due to the inclusion of important, yet immeasurable considerations that are 
generated by an attack.  Such complications of estimation efforts are due to several 
characteristics of a radiological event.  Most notably is the public perception of radiation and the 
personal decisions civilians will make based on their fears.  In addition, the variability in 
location, amount of explosive and radiological material, dispersion method, weather patterns, 
and response capabilities creates a multitude of possibilities.  Furthermore, modeling economic 
influences between industry sectors has historically been difficult due to a lack of timely data 
from economic indicators and vague relationships between sectors.   Consequently, the actual 
economic impact from an RDD event is commonly presented as a range of values based on 
educated guesses with bounded rationality.   
Research Questions 
 The goal of this research is to create a simulation tool that allows researchers or 
responders the ability to see the impact of various policy tools on the local economy.  To that 
end, the following research questions must be answered. 
1.  What variables influence an economic system that has been attacked with a radiological 
dispersion device? 
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2. How can federal government policy influence the overall cost of an RDD attack to the 
local community? 
3. How can response agencies influence the overall cost of an RDD attack to the local 
community? 
4. What effects do governmental agencies and regulatory bodies have upon a community’s 
recovery? 
 
Research Method 
This thesis proposes the use of a systems perspective to model aggregated influences of 
the targeted system in an effort to gain insight to the more valuable information of how the 
economic impact can be limited rather than presenting a final range of financial figures.   There 
is significant benefit in creating a dynamic model instead of generating a list of estimated 
expenditures.  The most recent studies concerning fiscal impact of a terrorist attack are limited to 
estimates of losses per economic sector.  Even if those analysis methods can one day determine 
the actual cost of a terrorist attack, what would be the effect?  A ten million dollar price tag that 
is developed years after the event will not generate a different response from the government or 
populace than an attack with a ten billion dollar price tag.  The development of a dynamic model 
that explains the influences of entities within the economic system will better serve decision 
makers by providing insights that can mitigate the effects of a radiological terrorist attack.   
Assumptions and Limitations 
The dynamic model presented is a simplified, macro level view of the influences related 
to the economic system.  It will not include actual economic input data on the impacted 
community from sources such as the Department of Revenue.  This limitation is placed on the 
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model due to the desire for generalization across all communities instead of a specific case study.  
It is the argument of the researcher that economic input-output analysis of such data is irrelevant, 
and by no means timely, to the recovery of the community.  
 Implications 
The ability for decision makers associated with the recovery efforts to understand the 
dynamic influences within the economic system is vital if the local area is to rebound from a 
radiological terrorist attack.  For example, once the initial response phase ceases and 
decontamination operations are relinquished to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
expected timetable to begin clean up is measured in months to years.  By giving decision makers 
insight into the influences the speed of their recovery efforts have upon the public’s resilience, 
policy changes can be made to ensure that the speed of recovery meets public demand.  Having 
such insight might have made the results of the post Hurricane Katrina environment in New 
Orleans much different.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responded in 
accordance with the prepared plans for hurricane response.  However, like the EPA, the 
timetables were measured in weeks to months and did not meet the needs of the population.  
Consequently, FEMA efforts were unable to restore public resilience in New Orleans and the 
result was approximately 50 percent of the population not returning to the city (Campanella, 
Spring 2006).   
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II. Literature Review 
Historical Examples 
 Radiological Incidents 
The topic of radiological terrorism has received much attention since 2001 when the 
American public realized that terrorists really do want to kill our citizens and can reach our 
homeland.  However, much of the talk is speculative at best.  This is primarily due to the lack of 
data on such an event.  While Chechen rebels have attempted to implement an RDD and detailed 
plans for an RDD were found in al Qaeda training camps, no organization has accomplished an 
actual detonation that has been publicized by any government (Steinhausler, 2005).  Due to this 
lack of data on RDD affects, most data specific to radiological incidents is gathered from the 
Goiania, Brazil, Chernobyl, and Three Mile Island incidents.   
 “The tragic radiological accident that occurred in Brazil between 13 September 
1987 and March 1988 is the closest event to a true RDD attack. While the parallels are 
not exact, study of the incident provides some insight into the possible progress of a case 
of radiological terrorism.” (Zimmerman, 2004)  In September, 1987 two thieves stole a 
radioactive source from an abandoned medical facility.  After breaking it open, they 
exposed the radiation to themselves, their families, and friends for several days as the 
thieves played with the glowing blue material.  Thinking it was valuable, the thieves sold 
the material to a junkyard owner who subsequently spread the contamination further.  
After the incident area was finally locked down and treated, 5 people had died, 28 more 
were treated for radiation burns, and 249 others were exposed to the cesium 137 
radiation.  Mass panic ensued across Goiania as the result of the incident.  Family 
members refused to board their evacuated relatives and Goiania residents were assaulted 
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trying to enter other cities (Steinhausler, 2005).  These effects are at the center of this 
research.  The mass panic that ensued due to the incident is an indication of what 
American citizens may do once they find out that a RDD has been detonated in the local 
area.  While only 28 people suffered from acute radiation sickness and only 5 people 
died, approximately 125,000 people were surveyed for possible exposure and monitored 
for several years after the incident (Steinhausler, 2005).     
The second example, but largest radiological material release, was at the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant incident.  This disaster released roughly 100 times the 
combined radioactive material of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan.  
As in Goiania, the perceived radioactive effects were reported by over two million people 
with another two million continuing to be monitored for atypical cancer rates, pulmonary 
complications, and other radiation symptoms.  However, unlike Goiania, the Chernobyl 
incident complete wiped out the local economies causing nearby towns to be vacated and 
permanently quarantined (Steinhausler, 2005).  
 The most valid example of how the American media and public will react to 
radiological terrorism is the incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.   
Although no radiation exited the facility, the sensationalized media coverage and 
widespread public fear arguably threatened the future of the nuclear power industry.  
Public relations personnel from the plant and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not 
have a public information plan in place to deal with the incident (Congressional Research 
Service, 1999).  Consequently, the quality of media coverage was less than adequate to 
deal with the public’s lack of understanding with respect to radiation hazards.  This lack 
of reporting quality was compounded by the sensationalized coverage by news anchors, 
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such as Walter Cronkite, who used terms such as, “the worst nuclear power plant accident 
of the atomic age,” “horror” and “catastrophe” (Congressional Research Service, 1999).  
A positive influence cited as a counteracting the public fear created by the media was the 
intervention of Governor and Lt. Governor through news conferences designed to instill 
calm. 
With the combination of these events several generalization s can be made 
concerning a radiological attack.  First, we can expect to see mass public panic in the 
absence of formal information.  Second, the effects of the radiation may be widely 
dispersed and is mitigated by the rapid diagnosis of the symptoms as being radiological 
or emergency responders quickly identifying that the scene is contaminated.  Finally, we 
can generalize that the negative impacts to the local economy will be long lasting and 
possibly permanent if external, positive influences are not initiated by the Federal 
Government. 
The Attacks of September 11, 2001 
Much has been written concerning the impacts of the September 11, 2001 attack 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  The General Accountability Office has 
published several studies in an attempt to quantify the attacks, yet due to the vagueness of 
the data and the influences on the economy, their estimates are vague.  “As GAO 
reported previously, precisely measuring the attack’s effect on economic activity and tax 
revenues is inherently difficult, because it must be disentangled from other factors that 
also reduce tax revenues.” (General Accountability Office, 2005).  A constant trend in the 
GAO reports is the measurement of tax revenues losses and employment numbers as a 
means to determine the economic impact.  However, the GAO misses other 
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considerations necessary to achieve a more true cost.  For example, each of the 
publications found to date do not include the governmental and private investments that 
would decrease the bottom line cost for the local community, nor does the GAO appear to 
include insurance claims or the cost of displaced businesses or persons.  The list of 
associated costs may possibly be endless once individuals or businesses in the economic 
chain, above or below those impacted by the attack, are included into the final cost.  For 
example, the financial securities companies located in the World Trade Center were 
wiped out on September 11, 2001.  Their absence in the marketplace drove cost increases 
to their clients who may have lost records of their investments, their time to find new 
brokers, and years of experience that was critical to the success of clients (Government 
Accountability Office, 2005).  Another way of thinking about the effect on the economic 
chain can be found in the economic ripple effect seen in communities that have large 
companies go bankrupt.  Not only are the jobs lost, but the jobs that supported those 
people are lost, suppliers no longer have a client to sell their wares to, and buyers have to 
go elsewhere to find the products they need for their business.  In each case, such effects 
of a terrorist attack can be expected to impact the economies of the attack location and 
spread across the state, region, nation, and possibly globally.   
In response to the September 11 attacks, Congress passed several appropriations 
acts in an attempt to control the perceived macro-economic impact.  For New York 
specifically, financial assistance was provided to reimburse the city for emergency 
expenditures and debris removal, as well as direct aid to individuals and businesses, and 
stimulus packages designed to reinvigorate the local economy through development 
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incentives (Congressional Research Service, 2002).  In all, Congress provided $21.6 
billion specifically to aid in New York’s recovery. 
Natural Disasters 
The macro level economic effects of major natural disasters have been widely 
published since the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Louisiana and Mississippi coast.  
In many ways the damage caused by the flooding generated by a hurricane is similar to 
the damage caused by a RDD.  The flood waters invade all structures, surfaces, 
infrastructure and goods in its path.  After the waters recede, the infected materials are 
generally intact and possibly reusable; however, the flood waters leave behind dangerous 
bacteria and pathogens that can be harmful or even fatal.  Consequently, the structures or 
materials must be decontaminated or destroyed before the populace is allowed to use the 
item or structure again.  For radiological contamination, the structures or goods will 
appear to be free from harm, but should actually be destroyed or decontaminated before 
use.  Due to the similarities between the effects of hurricanes and radiation, estimates of 
post storm population growth, economic resilience, tax revenue losses and the 
attractiveness of the impacted cities to future business growth should be considered.   
Three years after the hurricane impacted the city, roughly 46% of the New 
Orleans residents had not returned primarily due to lack of housing, jobs, and services 
(McCarthy, Peterson, & Sastry, 2006).  It has also been noted that plans to restore 
infrastructure and housing are not likely to address the full system surrounding 
community recovery or the community’s resilience (Campanella, Spring 2006).  
Consequently, in the context of community recovery following a radiological attack, the 
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model must address not only the needs for infrastructure rebuilding, but the physical and 
psychological needs of the citizens if a resilient community is to be created.   
Federal Response Capabilities 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is charged with response 
to natural and man-made disasters within the United States.  If the President declares an 
area a major disaster, FEMA is authorized to respond with assistance in several ways.  
First, FEMA offers seventeen different grant programs to provide individuals and 
businesses with immediate assistance.  Secondly, it provides disaster relief through 
immediate needs such as direct food, water, and shelter support and the coordination of 
charity organizations, such as the Red Cross, to do the same.  Lastly, it provides 
psychological assistance for survivors needing to cope with stress and creating a personal 
plan to move forward (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009).  This is positive 
influence on the physical and psychological needs of the community is vital for creating 
resilience to the attack as well as economic recovery. 
Similarly, the Small Business Administration (SBA) is, “a signatory to the 
National Response Plan (NRP), SBA is a part of the federal government’s single 
comprehensive approach to domestic incident management to prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from major disasters, terrorist attacks and other emergencies” 
(United States Small Business Administration, 2008).  The effect of SBA disaster 
assistance provides individuals and businesses that were not prepared for the fiscal 
impact of a terrorist attack the financial means, through low or no interest loans, to 
recover.  Following the September 11 attacks, the SBA expanded disaster assistance 
lending to businesses that were not physically in lower Manhattan, but could prove 
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financial impact from the attacks (Congressional Research Service, 2002).  The 
expansion of assistance coverage directly addresses the ripple effect of economics by 
adsorbing the system shock felt across the impacted industries.  One potential benefit to 
the local economy of this expansion of coverage is the lack of need for entities serving or 
being served by impacted businesses to look elsewhere for products, support, or service.  
Consequently, the SBA disaster assistance is also vital to the immediate and long term 
recovery of the local economy by addressing the needs of unprepared individuals or 
businesses.   
Response Considerations 
 RDD response is broken into three phases, early, intermediate, and late (Conklin, 
Proposed Framework for Cleanup and Site Restoration Following a Terrorist Incident 
Involving Radioactive Material, 2005).  The early stage of response will be focused on 
life saving and containment of the radioactive material.  This phase may last from a few 
days to several weeks depending on the complexities surrounding the detonation and 
deposition.  It is not until the intermediate phase, measured in weeks to months, that 
involved stakeholders will begin charting a path to recovery.  During the late phase of 
response, measured in months to years, considerations such as acceptable radiation levels 
for cleanup efforts, economic recovery plans, and public acceptability of the results 
should be the focus of responding agencies and stakeholders (Conklin, Proposed 
Framework for Cleanup and Site Restoration Following a Terrorist Incident Involving 
Radioactive Material, 2005).   It is recommended that stakeholders should be involved in 
the decision making process to ensure transparency, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and 
shared accountability.  In the context of economic impact, the inclusion of stakeholders 
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can have a positive influence on the speed of recovery assuming that the included 
stakeholders agree with the recommendations of technical experts.  Speeding the 
recovery of the community accelerates the economic forces involved would have a 
positive influence on the resilience of the economic system. 
Economic Resilience 
 Economic resilience is defined as, “the inherent and adaptive responses to 
disasters that enable individuals and communities to avoid some potential losses” (Rose, 
Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters, 2004).  Due to the expectedly 
small size of and RDD, the economic resilience of a community following an RDD attack 
concerns microeconomic and mesoeconomic influences such as individual behavior of 
businesses and households, specific economic sectors, and individual markets.  By 
employing mitigation and recovery management techniques, economic resilience can be 
enhanced.  While mitigation management of the RDD effects would commonly take 
place prior to an attack, recovery management is a function of local, state, and federal 
responding agencies.  Therefore, the disaster assistance from responding agencies creates 
a positive influence on the resilience of the community and ultimately the community’s 
recovery. 
Consumer Confidence 
 Immediately following the September 11 attacks, it was believed by many 
that the economy would stumble into a recession.  However, it was later determined that 
the economy as a whole was already headed into a recession prior to the attacks and 
subsequently returned to positive growth several quarters after the attack.  A noted 
problem with the fiscal impact estimates from terrorist attacks is the establishment of an 
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economic baseline just prior to the attack (Government Accountability Office, 2005).  
Consequently, in order for this research to adjust for changes in economic baselines, the 
model will need to include an adjustment tool that mimics the economic trend just prior 
to the attack.  The timeliest indicator of where the economy is headed is the Consumer 
Confidence Index or the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment and GDP growth. 
(Ludvigson, 2004). 
Both measures are calculated from monthly surveys that ask consumers from across the 
country five questions concerning their outlook on the economy.  Consumer confidence 
in the future of the local economy following a terrorist attack should be a vital concern of 
decision makers in the intermediate and late stages of RDD incident response.  
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III. Research Method 
Studies of the economic impact of RDD attacks are generally focused on specific, 
bounded case studies such as maritime ports or water supplies.  Such boundaries must be drawn 
to simplify the multitude of possible attack scenarios.  Unfortunately, due to the vague, yet 
strong influences and feedback systems between economic sectors, community resilience, and 
government responses, each of these studies are likely to omit significant economic impacts.  
Furthermore, unless governmental entities can identify and track the necessary data to 
encompass all fiscal losses due to a terrorist attack, all models will continue to miss the true 
mark.  In an effort to overcome this boundary in the current literature, this research aggregates 
costs into more broad categories and uses a system dynamics approach to modeling the 
influences upon the total economic impact in an effort to gain insight into the dynamic system 
surrounding the attack.   
General View of the Modeling Process 
 System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex feedback 
systems (Daum, 2001).  Through imitation of real world processes or systems, system dynamics 
can explore system behavior to gain insight into the dynamic influences involved (Shelley, 
2008).  The modeling process includes five primary steps: problem articulation (boundary 
selection), formulation of a dynamic hypothesis, formulation of a simulation model, testing, and 
policy design and evaluation.  Table 1 provides further details of the steps involved.
 Although the process is presented in a step by step format, the final product is the result 
of an iterative effort.  As demonstrated in Figure 1, the results of any one of the steps can result 
in insight that will yield changes to the model.  
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Table 1: Steps of the Modeling Process ( after Sterman, 2000) 
Modeling Step Elements of  the Step 
  Theme selection: What is the problem? Why is it a problem? 
  Key variables: What are the key variables and concepts we must consider? 
Step 1: Problem Articulation 
Time horizon: How far into the future should we consider?  How far back in the 
past lie the roots of the problem? 
(Boundary Selection) 
Dynamic problem definition (reference modes): What is the historical behavior 
of the key concepts and variables?  What might their behavior be in the future? 
    
    
  Initial hypothesis generation: What are the current theories of the  
  problematic behavior? 
  Endogenous focus: Formulate a dynamic hypothesis that explains the  
Step 2: Formulation of Dynamic dynamics as endogenous consequences of the feedback structure 
Hypothesis Mapping: Develop maps of causal structure based on initial hypothesis,  
  key variables, reference modes, and other available data, using tools such as;  
   model boundary diagrams causal loop diagrams, stock and flow maps,  
  and policy structure diagrams. 
    
  Specification of structure, decision rules. 
Step 3: Formulation of a 
Simulation Model Estimation of parameters, behavioral relationships, and initial conditions. 
   Tests for consistency with the purpose and boundary 
    
  Comparison to reference modes: Does the model reproduce the problem  
   behavior adequately for your purpose? 
Step 4: Testing Robustness under extreme conditions: Does the model behave realistically 
   when stressed by extreme conditions? 
  Sensitivity: How does the model behave given uncertainty in parameters,  
  initial conditions, model boundary, and aggregation? 
    
  Scenario specification:  What environmental conditions might arise? 
  Policy design: What new decision rules, strategies, and structures might  
  be tried in the real world?  How can they be represented in the model? 
Step 5: Policy Design and 
Evaluation 
"What if…" analysis: What are the effects of policies? 
Sensitivity analysis: How robust are the policy recommendations under  
  different scenarios and given uncertainties? 
  Interactions of policies: Do the policies interact?  Are there synergies 
   or compensatory responses? 
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Figure 1: The Iterative Nature of the Modeling Process (after Sterman, 2000) 
 
 
Figure 2:  Modeling is Embedded in the Dynamics of the System (after Sterman, 2000) 
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Step 1:  Problem Articulation (Boundary Selection) 
 Theme Selection 
 The single most important step in the modeling process is clearly defining the problem 
being studied.  Once a clear purpose for the model has been identified, it is critical to then set 
boundaries on the model.  Models are designed to represent a problem within a system and not 
the complete complex system.  If a model was truly created to mimic an entire complex system, 
it would become as incomprehensible as the real world system surrounding the problem of 
interest (Sterman, 2000).  In order to limit the model to the problem of interest, boundaries are 
established based on aggregated feedback loops of the factors considered relevant to the question 
at hand.  The factors that influence the problem under study are identified through discussion 
with client teams or subject matter experts, supplemented by archived research, data collection, 
interviews, and direct observation (Sterman, 2000).   
In the case of radiological terrorist attacks, there have not been any documented, 
successful attacks.  The consequent lack of data leads to the formulation of theme selection 
through historical data from other terrorist attacks and expert opinion.   
 Key Variables 
 The process of defining the problem of interest must include the definitions of key 
variables.  Variables of the problem of interest are defined by the research client or subject 
matter experts as being key in the system surrounding the problem.   
Dynamic Problem Definition (Reference Modes) 
A system dynamics model seeks, “to characterize the problem dynamically, that is, as a 
pattern of behavior, unfolding over time, which shows how the problem arose and how it might 
evolve in the future” (Sterman, 2000).  Reference modes of behavior over time are established 
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for each key variable in the form of graphs of behavior versus time.  Reference modes are named 
such because the researcher must reference them continually throughout the modeling process to 
help the researcher and the client break away from a short term viewpoint and into a long term 
understanding of the cause and effect relationships surrounding the problem. (Sterman, 2000)  
To ensure the x-axis variable, time, is adequate, a time horizon must be established.  Figure 3 
illustrates common behaviors over time.  Each of these reference modes of behavior are 
examples of real world, everyday problems we witness.  For example, the media message 
following a terrorist attack might mimic the overshoot and collapse reference mode of behavior.  
The exponential growth of information and broadcasts might last until such time as another 
headline story becomes available.  Eventually, the terrorist attack becomes a minimal topic for 
the evening news and is referenced less as time progresses.  Such was the case following the 
Three Mile Island incident where there was extreme coverage immediately following the attack 
that dwindled over time as other topic of the day became more interesting to the public 
(Congressional Research Service, 1999).  
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Figure 3: Examples of Reference Modes of Behavior (after Sterman, 2000) 
 
Time Horizon 
 The time horizon identified for the model should, “extend far enough back in history to 
show how the problem emerged and describe its symptoms.  It should extend far enough into the 
future to capture the delayed and indirect effects of potential policies” (Sterman, 2000).  A 
common mistake of decision makers surrounding a terrorist attack is to, “associate cause and 
effect as local and immediate” (Sterman, 2000).  An example of this phenomenon was witnessed 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as the levee systems surrounding southern Louisiana 
parishes were examined.  State and federal government officials immediately assumed the storm 
effects were too much for the designed levee system.  Consequently, the Army Corps of 
Engineers was asked to rebuild larger, stronger levees with a corresponding increase in 
construction costs.  Upon further investigation by the federal government, it was revealed that 
many of the breeched levees were the result of many years of neglect by the local levee boards.   
 20 
 
 Due to the lack of data concerned strictly with radiological terrorism, the timeline for this 
thesis effort will be based on the recovery efforts of other terrorist attacks on American soil and 
response plans from the EPA and DHS.    
Step 2: Formulation of Dynamic Hypothesis 
 Initial Hypothesis Generation and Endogenous Focus 
 Once the modeler has formulated a clear problem with defined variables and reference 
modes of behavior, the formulation of a dynamic hypothesis is required to explain the behavior 
of the problematic system.  The hypothesis is dynamic because it provides an explanation of the 
dynamics surrounding the problem in terms of the underlying feedback loops and stock and flow 
structures of the system.  It is a hypothesis because it is always provisional, and therefore subject 
to revision or abandonment as the modeling process progresses and provides further insight into 
the problem (Sterman, 2000).   
 The goal of the modeling process is to develop an endogenous (arising from within) 
explanation for the problematic dynamics of the system.  An endogenous hypothesis generates 
the dynamics of the system through the variables and agents represented (Sterman, 2000).  
Exogenous variables must be kept to a minimum since they may have negative effects on the 
model output.  Each exogenous variable must be examined carefully to insure there are feedback 
loops from the endogenous variables.  Should a feedback loop be discovered, then the model 
boundaries must be expanded to include the exogenous variable.    
Mapping: Causal Loop Diagrams 
 Causal loop diagrams are, “useful tools for diagramming the feedback structure of 
systems in any domain” (Sterman, 2000).  Simply put, they are diagrams that show the cause and 
effect relationships between variables within the model as well as model boundaries (Shelley, 
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2008).  Variables in the causal loop diagrams are connected with arrows and either a positive (+) 
or a negative (-) symbol to indicate the link polarity between the variables.  For example, the 
relationship between the amounts of information concerning radiation effects that are presented 
through the mass media will have a negative influence on public fear.  As the amount of 
information increases, the level of public fear decreases.  Further explanation of link polarity can 
be found in Table 2.  Each endogenous variable has a causal link with the other variables in the 
system and a feedback mechanism.  Variables that demonstrate only a single causal link, without 
feedback from the system, are considered to be exogenous variables.   
Table 2: Link Polarity; Definitions and Examples (after Sterman, 2000) 
 
 Within the causal loop diagram, feedback loops are presented that denote either a 
reinforcing behavior loop, denoted with an “R,” or a compensating behavior loop, denoted with a 
“C.”  As illustrated in Figure 4, a reinforcing loop generates exponential growth of the behavior 
involved and a compensating loop generates exponential decay of the behavior involved.  A 
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feedback loop is considered reinforcing if there is an even number of negative causal polarities 
within the feedback loop.  Likewise, a feedback loop is considered compensating is there are an 
odd number of negative causal polarities within the feedback loop.   
 As part of the modeling process, delays in feedback between variables must be identified 
and added to the dynamic model.  Delays in a system create inertia, create oscillations, and 
commonly cause the trade-offs between the short-term and long-run effects of policies.  The 
model should include delays that are significant to the dynamic hypothesis or are relative to the 
time horizon (Sterman, 2000). 
 Figure 4: Causal Loop Diagram Notation (after Sterman, 2000) 
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The combined behavior of multiple feedback loops within the model depends on what 
loop is currently dominating given the state of the system at that time.  The current state of the 
system depends on stock levels of variables or the strength between key relationships (Shelley, 
2008).  During the formulation phase of modeling, the modeler undergoes numerous iterations of 
causal loop diagramming as the mental model of the system is refined (Shelley, 2008).   
 
Step 3: Formulation of a Simulated Model 
 
 Once the dynamic hypothesis, model boundaries, and conceptual model have been created, 
the modeler will then test them using a stock and flow diagram created within the STELLA© 
software.  Causal loop diagrams are effective tools for illustrating the feedback processes and 
interdependencies of a system.  However, they are not as effective in capturing the stock and 
flow structure of the system.  Stocks and flows, along with feedback, are the two central 
concepts of dynamic systems theory (Sterman, 2000).  Stocks and flows can track the 
accumulations of material, money, information, etc… as each move through the system.  Stocks 
accumulate the difference between inflows and outflows and include such things as inventories 
of populations, debt, and products.   Flows are the push or pull units of stock per unit of time, or 
rates of increase or decrease in stocks, such as shipments, borrowing or repayment, or 
expenditures (Sterman, 2000).  Stocks represent the state of the system and generate the 
information upon which decisions are made.  The decisions made then alter the rates of flow, 
altering the stocks and closing feedback loops within the system (Sterman, 2000).  Figure 5 
demonstrates four equivalent representations of the stock and flow structure.   
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Figure 5: Representations of Stock and Flow Structures (after Sterman, 2000) 
 
 
     
 
  In addition to stocks and flows, additional variables are included in the model.  As seen in 
Figure 6, auxiliary variables are either constants or exogenous inputs to the model.  They can be 
are used to convert units of X into units of Y, input exogenous influences, and distinguish 
feedback loops (Sterman, 2000).  For example, if an RDD attack involved disruptions to the 
power grid, an auxiliary variable of “No Electricity” would decay the outflow of the stock 
“Radiation Safety Information.”  That is, without electricity, the outflow of information to the 
public would be reduced to a trickle since most mass media outlets require electricity (i.e. 
television and radio). 
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Figure 6: Example of Auxiliary Variables within the STELLA Program 
 
 
 
 The model is created based on the reference modes of behavior and the causal loop 
diagram.  It is important that all variables within the causal loop diagram be represented within 
the model and that the output agrees with the reference modes of behavior for each stock 
(Sterman, 2000).  Once the model produces behavior that mimics the reference mode behavior, 
testing of the model can begin.   
Step 4: Testing 
 Validation of the model cannot be gained by any single test or set of test.  Model 
validation comes from confidence in the model as more tests are passed and new points of 
correspondence between the model and empirical reality are identified (Shelley, 2008).  As seen 
in Table 2, there are seven tests to identify problems with the model and build confidence in its 
accuracy.   
 
 
 
 
Stock
Inf low Outf low
Auxiliary  Variable
as a Conv ersion Unit 
of  the Inf low
Auxiliary  Variable 
as an Exogenous Variable
Inf luencing Outf low
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Table 3: Tests for the Assessment of Dynamic Models (after Sterman, 2000) 
Test Purpose of Test 
Boundary Adequacy 
Are the important concepts for addressing the problem 
endogenous to the model? 
Does the behavior of the model change significantly 
when the boundary assumptions are relaxed? 
Do the policy recommendations change when the 
model boundary is extended? 
Structure Assessment 
Is the model structure consistent with relevant 
descriptive knowledge of the system? 
Is the level of aggregation appropriate? 
Does the model conform to basic physical plans such 
as the EPA Protective Action Guide? 
Do the decision rules capture the behavior of the actors 
in the system? 
Parameter Assessment 
Are the parameter values consistent with relevant 
descriptive and numerical knowledge of the system? 
Do all parameters have real world counterparts? 
Extreme Conditions 
Does each equation make sense even when its inputs 
take on extreme values? 
Does the model respond plausibly when subjected to 
extreme policies, shocks, and parameters? 
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Table 3 (cont): Tests for the Assessment of Dynamic Models (after Sterman, 2000) 
 
Test Purpose of Test 
Behavior Anomaly Do anomalous behaviors result when assumptions of the model are changed or deleted? 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Numerical Sensitivity: Do the numerical values change 
significantly… 
Behavioral Sensitivity: Do the modes of behavior 
generated by the model change significantly… 
Policy Sensitivity: Do the policy implications change 
significantly… 
…when assumptions about parameters, boundary, and 
aggregation are varied over the plausible range of 
uncertainty? 
Behavior Reproduction 
Does the model reproduce the behavior of interest in 
the system (qualitatively and quantitatively)? 
Does it endogenously generate the symptoms of 
difficulty motivating the study? 
Does the model generate the various modes of 
behavior observed in the real system? 
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Step 5: Policy Testing Evaluation 
 Once the model has passed each of the seven tests, the model can be explored to 
formulate the best policies to drive the desired behavior of the system.  In the example of an 
attack using an RDD, the desired effect is to minimize the amount of economic harm.  An 
effective model will present decision makers with the ability to explore the effects of Executive 
agency responses, Congressional interventions, and media campaigns.  It is important to note that 
unless there is empirical data associated with the system; policy decisions should be based on 
behavior patterns not specific quantified outputs at a desired time.  As in any model, predictions 
of the value of a variable at a specific point in time are likely to different than in reality due to 
the noise surrounding the system (Sterman, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
IV. Model Formulation and Analysis 
 
Problem Articulation 
Theme Selection 
       A system dynamics research model begins by clearly defining the problem and selecting 
appropriate boundaries.  The central theme of this model is the dynamic influences within the 
local economy from an RDD detonation.  While the system surrounding the economic influence 
of a terrorist attack using an RDD is complex and vague; micro-economic and meso-economic 
influences can be aggregated, mapped and modeled.  Macro-economic effects are not likely to be 
realized from such a small ripple in the economic system and therefore are not of interest 
(Congressional Research Service, 2002).   
 There is common interest within the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Environmental Protection Agency to estimate the actual cost of such an attack; however, this 
thesis proposes that actual dollar estimates for economic impact are merely semantics and the 
true concern is how to minimize the total economic impact.  To this end, the theme of this 
dynamic model will be on the methods with which response agencies, state and federal 
government, and the media can influence the financial impact and prevent collapse of the local 
economy.   
 Key Variables  
 The dynamic system surrounding an RDD detonation consists of three primary sub-
systems of interest to the total economic impact upon a local economy.  These three subsystems 
are the Physical Impacts, Psychological Impacts, and the Federal Response.  Each sub-system 
influences the total economic impact on the local economy through various feedback loops.  
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Only realized costs are accounted for within the dynamic system eliminating such losses as the 
expected decrease in property values.  
 The physical impact sub-system consists of seven aggregated variables.  They are: 
personal losses, business losses, tax revenue losses, decontamination costs, response costs, 
reconstruction costs, and morbidity costs.  The psychological impact sub-system variables 
include the mass media sensationalized message, public fear, business confidence, consumer 
confidence, community resilience, and community recovery.  The federal government response 
variables include the executive response, legislative response, RDD risk education, stakeholder 
involvement, revitalization plans, Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster assistance 
loans, and Small Business Administration assistance loans. Descriptions of each dynamic 
variable can be found in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Listing of Dynamic Variables 
 
Dynamic Variables 
Physical Impact Sub-System 
Variable Description 
Total Economic Impact Summation of all Physical Impact Stocks 
Personal Losses Accumulation of personal losses from job loss, property damage, evacuation, or injury 
Business Losses Accumulation of business losses from productivity interruption or property damage 
Tax Revenue Losses Accumulation of tax revenue reductions from sales and property taxes 
Decontamination Costs Accumulation of decontamination costs 
Response Costs Accumulation of response costs 
Reconstruction Costs Accumulation of reconstruction costs 
Morbidity Costs Accumulation of the value of statistical life of deceased victims 
Psychological Impact Sub-System 
Mass Media Sensationalized Message 
Accumulation of the mass media's 
sensationalized message concerning the 
attack 
Public Fear Accumulation of public fear 
Consumer Confidence Variable accumulation of local consumer confidence 
Business Confidence Variable accumulation of local business confidence 
Community Resilience Accumulation of the amount of resilience a community generates after an attack 
Community Recovery Accumulation of the level of recovery of the shocked system 
 
 
 
  
 32 
 
Table 4 (continued): Listing of Dynamic Variables 
 
Dynamic Variables 
Federal Government Response Sub-System 
Variable Description 
Executive Response 
Accumulation of the level of response from 
the Executive Branch of the Federal 
Government 
Legislative Response 
Accumulation of the level of response from 
the Legislative Branch of the Federal 
Government 
RDD Risk Education 
Accumulation of the amount of radiological 
risk education presented by agencies of the 
Executive Branch 
Stakeholder Involvement 
Accumulation of the involvement of local 
stakeholders with agencies of the Executive 
Branch 
Agreement of Cleanup Standards A product of stakeholder involvement  
Federal Revitalization Plan 
Accumulation of Federal Funding Tools used 
to offset local economic impact and promote 
recovery 
Federal Emergency Management 
Assistance Loans 
Accumulation of FEMA disaster assistance 
loans used to assist affected individuals and 
local government with economic hardship 
caused by the attack 
Small Business Administration 
Loans 
Accumulation of SBA low or no interest 
loans designed to assist small businesses in 
the local area recover from the attack 
Exogenous Variables 
Contaminated Area Variable accumulation of contaminated area influencing costs or losses 
Size of Weapon Exogenous variable that influences the size of the contaminated area 
Insurance Coverage Exogenous variable that influences personal and business losses 
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 Time Horizon 
 It is expected that without assistance from the federal government the economic impacts 
from an RDD detonation will cripple the local economy after the first year as the total loss 
begins to exceed the earning potential of the local area (Rosoff & Winterfeldt, 2007, Vol. 27). 
Therefore, the time horizon established for this model will be one year.    
 Reference Modes of Behavior 
 With the dynamic variables identified, reference modes of behavior must be identified 
within the system.  Through the literature review, several dynamic variables were identified 
within the system that exhibit behavior patterns over time.  The identification of variables with 
reference modes of behavior is critical to the foundation of a useful model (Shelly, 2008). 
Variables with reference modes of behavior include: the contaminated area, the total economic 
impact, public fear, business confidence, consumer confidence, community resilience, 
community recovery, executive response, and legislative response.   
 At the onset of an RDD attack, an area of contamination is generated that impacts all cost 
variables.  Within the time horizon of the model, it is expected that deposition of radioactive 
material will quickly occur and spread until response agencies begin to contain and eventually 
decontaminate the area.  Without any external influences, the contamination area is expected to 
exhibit an approach to steady state behavior, such as in Figure 7, with a corresponding model 
structure in Figure 8. 
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Figure 7: Reference Mode Behavior of the Contaminated Area 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Approach to Steady State Structure of Contaminated Area 
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 Similarly, the dynamic variable total economic impact is expected to also have an 
approach to steady state behavior over time as all costs are realized throughout the year.  Unlike 
the contaminated area, the curve is expected to be more gradual as costs are expensed, paychecks 
are missed, and sales taxes losses are realized.  This yields a reference mode of behavior as 
exhibited in Figure 9 with a corresponding structure such as Figure 10. 
 
Figure 9: Reference Mode Behavior of Total Economic Impact 
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Figure 10: Approach to Steady State Structure of Total Economic Impact 
 
 
 In the examples of Three Mile Island and Goiania, Brazil provided in chapter two, the 
public perception of radiation rapidly generates public fear.  Without any external influences on 
the public’s fear of the risks imposed by an RDD detonation, it is expected that the fear will 
compound over time as in Figure 11.  The compounding behavior translates into a compounding 
structure in the STELLA modeling program. (Figure 12) 
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Figure 11: Reference Mode Behavior of Public Fear 
 
 
Figure 12: Compounding Structure of Public Fear 
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 The most likely scenario involving the detonation of an RDD will occur in a major 
metropolitan area (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  The local area surrounding the 
attack site will likely include businesses that rely on customers.  For those businesses fiscally 
impacted by the attack, their level of confidence in the ability of the local economy to recover is 
critical.  Similarly, the confidence of consumers supporting these businesses is equally vital in 
the recovery of the area.  Both of these dynamic variables present reference modes of behavior 
that can be modeled.   At the moment of attack, all else equal, the levels of business confidence 
and consumer confidence represent the benchmark for which full recovery will be based upon.  
Without any external influences, both variables are expected to drain over time until there is no 
confidence in either variable that the local economy will recover.  This reference mode of 
behavior is exhibited in Figure 13 with corresponding draining structure in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 13: Reference Mode Behavior of Business and Consumer Confidence 
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Figure 14: Draining Structure of Business and Consumer Confidence 
 
 Dynamic resilience is defined as the loss reducing effect of hastening recovery over time 
(Rose, 2007) (Rose, Economic resilience to natural and man-made disasters: Multidisciplinary 
origins and contextual dimensions, 2007).   In the context of economic resilience, the community 
is dependent upon  confidence from consumers and businesses that the community will recover.  
Consequently, the positive influence of business and consumer confidence will hasten the 
community’s resilience to rebound from the attack and eventually recover.  Without these 
confidence variables influencing community resilience, a community’s resilience is expected to 
drain over time.  This reference mode of behavior, Figure 15, is also modeled as a draining 
structure, Figure 16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conf idence
Losing Conf idence
Af ter Attack
Compounding the
Loss of  Conf idence
Business and Consumer Conf idence Structure
 40 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Reference Mode Behavior of Community Resilience 
 
 
Figure 16: Draining Structure of Community Resilience 
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 As presented by Adam Rose in Figure 17, the recovery of the impacted system resembles 
that of an S-shaped curve for each recovery effort over time.  This seems logical to the researcher 
and consequently the dynamic variable of community resilience is modeled with an S-shaped 
reference mode of behavior in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 17: Static and Dynamic Resilience in the Context of Business Interruption  
(after Rose, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
Figure 18: Reference Mode Behavior of Community Recovery 
 
 
 
 While local responders will be the first to respond to an RDD attack, they will quickly be 
replaced by the federal government as soon as the incident has been identified as an act of 
terrorism.  There will be an initial steep curve as responding federal agencies mobilize and 
become operational within the first few days of the response followed by a steady state of 
response.  This expected behavior yields an approach to steady state reference mode of behavior.  
Similarly, if the example of the legislative response following the September 11 attacks holds 
true, the legislative branch will respond in support of the executive branch as well as the 
economic areas impacted by the terrorist attack.  However, this response is likely to be fiscally 
more costly than the executive branch response as well as delayed in action as presented in 
Figure 20.  The reference modes of behavior for each variable are presented in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Reference Modes Behavior for Executive and Legislative Responses 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Approach to Steady State Structure of Executive and Legislative Responses 
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Dynamic Hypothesis    
 Problematic Behavior 
 As stated in the problem definition, this research seeks to understand the economic 
system surrounding an RDD attack with the intent of finding ways to reduce the total fiscal 
impact to the local economy.  Therefore, the problematic behavior of interest to this research is 
the final value of the total economic impact and the tools available to decision makers to reduce 
the maximum y-axis value of the total economic impact.  In Figure 21, curve one represents the 
uninfluenced behavior over time and curve two represents the implementation of various policies 
that have been used in historical examples of terrorist attacks or natural disasters. 
 
Figure 21: Problematic Behavior of Interest 
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Causal Loop Mapping  
 The behavior over time of the total economic impact is influenced by a system of 
interconnected variables.  Figure 22 demonstrates the various influences surrounding the 
problematic behavior and the polarity of each influence.   
 The event of a successful RDD attack generates a positive influence on the area of 
contamination; that is, as the size of the attack increases so does the size of the contaminated 
area.  The generation of a contaminated area creates influences on eight endogenous variables.  
Within the physical impact sub-system of the model, there is a positive influence of the size in 
contaminated area upon the personal losses, business losses, tax revenue losses, decontamination 
costs, response costs, reconstruction costs, and morbidity costs.  As the size of the contaminated 
area increases, so does the amount of costs incurred within each variable.  Similarly, as in the 
Three Mile Island example, a positive relationship exists between the existence of a 
contaminated area and the subsequent sensationalized mass media message covering the effects 
of the attack (Congressional Research Service, 1999). 
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Figure 22: Causal Loop Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Following the Three Mile Island incident, an “extraordinary” amount of broadcast time 
was devoted to coverage of the incident with words such as “horror,” “specter,” and  
“catastrophe” being used by media figureheads (Congressional Research Service, 1999).  The 
media influence on the public generated uneducated fear of radiation both locally and nationally 
(Congressional Research Service, 1999).  This is represented as a positive influence within the 
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causal loop diagram.  The generation of localized public fear creates a negative influence on the 
confidence of the community.  Specifically, business confidence and consumer confidence are 
both influenced by the perceptions of the impact of the attack on the community and the ability 
of the community to recover.  Similarly, the generation of widespread public fear generates a 
positive relationship on the federal response to the attack.  An example of this feedback loop was 
witnessed in the year following the September 11 attacks on the world trade center.  Families of 
the deceased were given money by Congress.  As word spread, the pressure on congressmen 
from their constituents to increase funding for families increased until eventually another 
appropriation was passed that encompassed families impacted by the attacks (Government 
Accountability Office, 2005). 
 Adam Rose defines economic resilience as, “the ability of an entity or system to maintain 
function (e.g., continue producing) when shocked.”  To influence the economic resilience of a 
community, supply-side and demand-side phenomenon must be addressed (Rose, 2007) (Smith, 
2008).  The demand-side of economic considerations involves the inputs from consumers and 
their willingness to spend or demand services within the impacted area.  Consumer attitudes are 
measured by the Consumer Confidence Index, a five question survey administered monthly to 
determine the amount of consumer confidence within the economy.  While this survey is 
administered as a macro-economic snapshot, the fundamental assumption that consumer 
confidence leads to consumer spending which stimulates the economy is the basis for the 
existence of a consumer confidence variable within the model.  Consequently, by influencing 
consumer confidence, the resilience of the system can be positively influenced.  Likewise, 
business confidence, the supply-side phenomenon, can also positively influence the community’s 
resilience.  
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 Recovery of the impacted system is achieved once the economic output of the system 
returns to pre-attack levels.  For each increase in the community’s resilience, the economic 
system takes incremental steps towards recovery.  This translates into a positive influence 
between community resilience and community recovery within the model.  Finally, each unit of 
recovery has a negative influence on the amount of contaminated area.  For example, one unit of 
recovery may represent the containment of the contamination which will decrease the size of the 
cordon area where contamination was thought to be present.  The negative relationship between 
community recovery and contamination area provides an important feedback loop within the 
system and allows decision makers the ability to bring the system under control once policies can 
be made to manipulate the variables within that particular reinforcing loop.   
 Without external influences, a local economy may never recover (Smith, 2008).  With the 
exception of some of our major cities, most of the small to medium sized cities within the United 
States do not have the internal expertise to deal with radiological terrorism.  Consequently, as in 
other United States terrorist attacks, the federal government is likely to respond through 
numerous agency efforts as well as legislative funding support.  The federal response variable 
provides the necessary compensating feedback to bring the local economic impact under control 
and potentially accelerate the economic output above that of pre-attack levels.   
Formulation of Model 
 With the reference modes of behavior identified as a baseline and a causal loop diagram 
as a roadmap, formulation of the model within the STELLA program can begin.  It is important 
to again note that this model represents the influences within the perceived system and not 
numeric calculations of specific costs as found in other economic impact research papers.  To 
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standardize the structures in the model, all conversion units have a value of .1 unless an 
adjustment is required to represent the specific logic embedded within the output graph.  
 The modeling process begins with creating stock and flow structures that create the 
reference mode of behavior for each variable that has an identified behavior over time.  Due to 
the size and complexity of the model, the three sub-systems are represented independently before 
influences between them are connected.  This gives the researcher further insight into the model 
as well as another opportunity to incrementally test the modeled behavior against the expected 
behavior.   
 Physical Impact 
 Within the physical impact sub-system, only the total economic impact variable has an 
expected behavior over time.  This behavior is represented as an approach to steady state with a 
model structure resembling that of Figure 23.  The “coefficient of realization” is a conversion 
unit that represents the rate at which costs are realized.  Adjusting this conversion unit adjusts the 
total economic curve.  It is also important to note that the inflow is bidirectional.  This allows the 
model the potential to not only recover, but to recover to a better state of economic output than 
found prior to the attack. 
Figure 23: Total Economic Impact Structure 
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Cost
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of  All Costs
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 Within the literature review, eight variables were identified as aggregated representations 
of the expected fiscal accumulations. The eight variables that influence the total economic 
impact on the local economy do not have an expected behavior over time and are represented 
simply as stocks, or accumulations, of losses or sunk costs over time.  The summation of each of 
these variables equals the total economic impact.  The complete physical impact structure is 
represented in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24: Physical Impact Structure 
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 Psychological Impact 
 The variables within the psychological sub-system are critical variables for decision 
makers to consider when faced with the establishment of a path to recovery, yet they are difficult 
to measure and analyze for a proper response.  Fortunately, all of the variables, except mass 
media sensationalized message, exhibit individual expected behaviors over time without external 
influences.  While the mass media sensationalized message may generally increase over time 
following the attack, the influences on such behavior cannot be standardized across all spectrums 
of media due to competing stories, political bents in coverage, and personal biases of editors.  
Consequently, this variable exists as a mere stock that is influenced by other variables.  Once the 
reference mode behaviors are translated into model structures, as in Figure 25, the influences 
between the psychological impact variables are modeled and result in the structure represented in 
Figure 26. 
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Figure 25: Psychological Impact Variables in Reference Mode Structures 
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Figure 26: Psychological Impact Structure 
 
 Exogenous Variables 
 There are three exogenous variables to consider within this model.  The size of the 
weapon used in the attack generates a relative size of contaminated area.  The existence of a 
contaminated area is the impetus for the system of study.  While the size of the weapon used in 
the attack is a fixed variable in this study, the contaminated area does have a reference mode of 
behavior in which the contamination quickly spreads until it is contained.  As demonstrated in 
Figure 7, an assumption of the model is that the contamination will be identified and contained 
within the first week following the attack.  To achieve this expected behavior over time, the 
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draining rate converter, Reduction Conversion, was changed from the uniform model standard of 
0.1 to 0.8 as seen in Figure 27.  By doing so, the contamination curve rapidly ascends within the 
first days until it levels off and persists until recovery actions can begin to decrease the 
contamination. 
 After the attacks of September 11, 2001, insurance companies were faced with the 
unexpected option of insurance claims following a terrorist attack.  At the time, risk analysis 
models did not exist for insurance companies to formulate their coverage options.  Consequently, 
some insurance companies have since removed coverage of claims caused by acts of terrorism 
(Congressional Research Service, 2002).  The decision to cover claims lies outside the realm of 
control for the stakeholders involved in the restoration efforts following an attack.  However, the 
influence of insurance coverage over personal and business losses has a direct effect on the 
losses sustained by those in the impacted economic system.  Consequently, insurance coverage is 
an exogenous variable within the model that can be turned on and off to compare the effects of 
coverage on individuals and businesses.  An assumption of the model is that insurance policies, 
even if they provided coverage, would not cover all losses realized by victims.  Consequently, 
the model includes a converter named coverage to loss ratio of 0.8, meaning that if there is 
coverage of claims, the policy would only cover 80% of the total losses.  If this assumption is 
undesirable, the model includes the ability to adjust this ratio to any desired value.  However, the 
80% coverage to value ratio is the standard for FEMA’s national flood insurance program and 
therefore perceived as a valid assumption (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009). 
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Figure 27: Exogenous Variables 
 
 Federal Response 
 As in other terrorist attacks, it is expected that there will be a federal response from both 
the executive and legislative branches.  In Figure 19, the reference modes of behavior of fiscal 
response for each branch of government are illustrated.  It is important to note that while the 
executive response will occur before the legislative response, the legislative response historically 
involves far more financial assistance.  In the recently published FEMA protective action guide 
for response to RDD and IND incidents, the education of the populace on the risks of radiation 
hazards, stakeholder involvement, and agreement on acceptable decontamination standards were 
noted as having influence on recovery efforts after the attack (Department of Homeland Security, 
2008).  Each of these variables is enacted by executive agencies, namely the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Environmental Protection Agency.  Therefore, each of these 
variables is included in the executive response model, Figure 28, as influencing variables within 
the psychological sub-system.  These influences will be discussed further in the complete model 
discussion. 
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 As reported by the GAO, following the September 11 attacks and numerous natural 
disasters, the legislative branch authorized funding through numerous outlets to assist in the 
recovery.  This funding was provided through several different mechanisms.  Some assistance 
was provided through low or no interest loans and distributed by the Small Business 
Administration.  Other funds were distributed by FEMA through disaster assistance grants, 
response reimbursement for equipment and labor, or payments to families of the dead—as was 
the case following the September 11 attacks.  For more long term recovery considerations, 
special tax incentive zones were created to stimulate business growth in the local economy.  Not 
only did this funding offset some of the physical losses, but it also generated positive 
psychological influences on businesses and consumers through reassurance of recovery as seen 
in lower Manhattan today.    Within this model, these psychological influences translate into a 
positive influence on business and consumer confidence.  
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Figure 28: Executive Response Structure 
 
Figure 29: Legislative Response Structure 
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 Complete Model 
 The onset of a terrorist attack involving an RDD triggers the creation of a contaminated 
area.  Initially, the suspected contaminated area will be large in relation to the actual radioactive 
material deposition.  During the early phase of response, the area of suspected contamination will 
decrease due to the identification of the actual deposition, this is a recovery event.  As time 
passes, other recovery efforts will continue to decrease the area of contamination and its effects 
on the local economy.  This expected recovery action provides a critical negative influence on 
the contaminated area variable (see Figure 30) and is the primary feedback mechanism between 
the exogenous variables and the psychological impact structure.   
  As the size of the contaminated area increases, the personal, business and tax revenue 
losses also increase in response to the lack of economic output within the suspected 
contaminated area.  These losses continue to grow over time until full recovery, defined as a 
return to pre-attack economic output, is achieved.  Similarly, the greater the contaminated area, 
the greater the costs associated with decontamination, response, reconstruction, and morbidity.  
These costs represent sunk costs that may or may not significantly change over time, yet each of 
these expenditures is a function of contamination and should therefore be included in the total 
economic impact.   
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Figure 30: Control of Contaminated Area through Recovery Events 
 
 Due to the physical size and numerous influences within the complete model, the 
following physical impact structures are presented individually with ghosted variables, such as 
community recovery, in Figure 30 above.  Ghosted variables are merely a copy of model entities, 
represented with a dashed outline, that are used to decrease confusion and clutter.  As noted in 
the causal diagram, the contaminated area is the only positive influence on each of the stock 
structures listed under physical impact.  Therefore, the only inflow for individual loss, business 
loss, tax revenue loss, decontamination cost, response costs, reconstruction costs, and morbidity 
costs will be from the contaminated area variable.  The various policy options used by the federal 
government can quickly offset some or all of the losses over time.  Consequently, these policies 
represent outflows for each stock structure within the physical impact structure.   
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 The accumulation of individual losses for those impacted by an RDD attack can be 
influenced by several policies (see Figure 31).  As noted in the causal diagram, recovery efforts 
influence both the contaminated area as well as individual losses over time.  An example of a 
recovery effort negatively influencing individual losses can be found the post-9/11 tax policies 
enacted by the New York City Office of Management and Budget (Government Accountability 
Office, 2005).  In an effort to stimulate growth around the attack area, tax relief policies were 
enacted that placed more funding in the pockets of constituents and businesses, thereby offsetting 
some amount of losses over time.  Another example of a community recovery effort that is non-
monetary yet reduces individual losses over time would be local government employment 
relocation assistance for those who lost their jobs due to the attack.  Both examples are units of 
recovery and negatively influence individual losses.   
 Following the September 11, 2001 attacks the insurance industry was faced with the 
unexpected decision of covering losses from terrorism or refusing related claims.  The literature 
suggested that some companies have completely refused to cover losses from a terrorist act while 
others have decided to price a specific premium in the event policy holders presented claims due 
to an act of terrorism.  Without knowing what the insurance industry will do concerning 
individual claims from an RDD attack, the model incorporates an insurance drain on the 
individual loss stock that can be turned on and off from the user interface panel.   
 In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks as well as numerous 
natural disasters, FEMA offers individuals several tools that offset the immediate fiscal impact 
from an event.  These fiscal offsets can be disaster assistance loans, relocation assistance grants, 
temporary housing, or even transportation out of the evacuated zone  (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2007).  In each instance, these efforts offset the losses to the impacted 
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individuals and therefore are a drain on the individual loss stock.  Due to the expected small size 
of the RDD contamination, it is possible that FEMA may not respond with such assistance; 
consequently, the FEMA response drain is modeled with an on/off switch to replicate this 
possibility.  
 Similar to the FEMA response, in both disaster examples the legislative branch passed 
various appropriation bills to assist in the recovery efforts.  However, it is important to note that 
both the effects of the September 11 attacks and major hurricanes are wide spread and directly 
impacted major financial sectors: Wall Street in New York City and the oil industry in the Gulf 
of Mexico specifically.  The fear of widespread macro-economic impact from these attacks was a 
consideration in the level of legislative response (Congressional Research Service, 2002). 
Therefore, it is possible that if an RDD attack was carried out in an area lacking a significant 
economic sector node, the federal legislative response may be far less or non-existent and the 
state is allowed and expected to handle the economic recovery.  Consequently, the ability for a 
revitalization plan from Congress to offset the individual losses is also modeled with an on/off 
switch so that users can explore the system behavior with and without a fiscal stimulus plan. 
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Figure 31: Individual Loss Structure with Influences from Psychological Impact Structure 
and Federal Response Structure 
 
 Similar to the individual loss structure, the business loss stock, Figure 32, is also 
negatively influenced by insurance coverage, community recovery efforts, and legislative 
revitalization plans.  However, an additional drain on business losses over time comes from the 
Small Business Administration.  This assistance is primarily in the form of low or no interest 
loans to impacted businesses (United States Small Business Administration, 2008).  While the 
expectation from the literature is that the SBA will provide some form of relief to businesses, 
significant federal spending must be authorized by the legislative branch.  Consequently, as a 
potential recovery effort that is dependent on legislative support, this drain is also modeled with 
an on/off switch found on the user navigation panel. 
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Figure 32: Business Loss Structure with Influences from Psychological Impact Structure 
and Federal Response Structure 
 
 The last variable expected to have increased losses over time is tax revenue.  Since the 
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compared to the September 11 attacks (Congressional Research Service, 2002). With businesses 
closed, a direct positive influence is created by lost sales revenue.  This model captures this 
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were never directly refunded by federal legislative action, the effect of stimulating economic 
growth created a negative influence on the overall tax revenue loss.  Similar to the drain created 
on business losses by the revitalization plan, this outflow is also modeled with an on/off switch 
to enable the exploration of system behavior with or without the presence of a stimulus package. 
 
Figure 33: Tax Revenue Loss Structure with Influences from Psychological Impact 
Structure and Federal Response Structure 
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decontamination costs is modeled with a switch to test the possibility of not paying for the 
decontamination costs.  An important consideration addressed in the most recent EPA Protective 
Action Guide for RDD incidents is the amount of acceptable radiation to the community.  This 
threshold establishes the cleanup standard that the decontamination costs will be dependent 
upon.  To establish this decontamination standard, the involvement of stakeholders in the 
community is required (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  Through information 
exchange between stakeholders and government agencies, such as proposed by Craig Conklin in 
Figure 34, the cleanup standards can be established (Conklin, 2005).  Due to the desired 
expediency of recovery, it is likely that decontamination standards will be agreed upon that is 
higher than the 14 mrem/yr standard (Smith, 2008).  Consequently, as the cleanup standard 
relaxes, the decontamination costs will decrease.  The drain on decontamination costs from a 
more lax cleanup standard is at risk since the local community stakeholders may not agree to 
lower the standards.  This possibility is modeled as an on/off switch within the decontamination 
cost structure. 
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Figure 34: Proposed RDD/IND Cleanup Process (after Conklin, 2005) 
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Figure 35: Decontamination Cost Structure with Influences from Federal Response 
Structure 
 
 Following the September 11 attacks, New York suffered significant response costs.  
Many, if not all, of the associated costs were aggregated by the New York City Management and 
Budget Office and submitted to the Federal Government for reimbursement (Government 
Accountability Office, 2005).  Similarly, following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA reimbursed 
municipalities for many types of response costs.  In both instances, legislative fiscal support 
offset local response costs which create the only drain on the response cost variable.  
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Figure 36: Response Cost Structure with Influences from Federal Response Structure 
 
 The final cost associated with an RDD attack is the cost of morbidity.  Should life 
insurance companies cover claims from impacted policy holders, this cost is expected to be 
eliminated.  However, following the September 11 attacks, some insurance companies denied 
coverage and the federal legislature stepped in to offset these costs through FEMA disaster 
assistance (Congressional Research Service, 2002).   
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Figure 37: Morbidity Cost Structure with Influences from Federal Response Structure 
 
 The final influences within the complete model are the effects of the federal response 
variables on the psychological impact variables, see Figure 38.  One of the most important 
influences within the model is the negative influence the radiological risk education can have on 
the sensationalized coverage of the attack.  In the literature, references to this influence were 
mentioned as a lesson learned from both the Three Mile Island incident and the Goiania, Brazil 
incident where misinformation and uneducated analysis by the media fed public fear.  
Additionally, within the Three Mile Island example, stakeholders such as Pennsylvania 
Lieutenant Governor William Scranton III was cited as also having a negative influence on the 
sensationalized coverage by both the local and national news media (Congressional Research 
Service, 1999).  Due to this influence, the policy variable, stakeholder involvement, within the 
federal response structure is also modeled as a drain on the mass media sensationalized message.  
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seen in more common incidents where news conferences and press releases reset the facts 
presented by the news media.   
 The last two influences from the federal response variables are the positive influences of 
FEMA disaster assistance and SBA loans on consumer and business confidence respectively.  
This relationship infers that the financial assistance from the Federal Government will have a 
positive influence on the confidence of impacted consumers and businesses that the local 
economy will recover.   
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Figure 38: Psychological Impact Structure Influenced by Federal Response Variables 
 
M
as
s 
M
ed
ia
 S
en
sa
tio
na
liz
ed
M
es
sa
ge
Pu
bl
ic
 F
ea
r
N
at
ur
al 
Fe
ar
 o
f 
At
ta
ck
C
om
po
un
di
ng
 F
ea
r
Bu
si
ne
ss
 C
on
fid
en
ce
Lo
si
ng
 C
on
fid
en
ce
Af
te
r A
tta
ckC
om
po
un
di
ng
 th
e
Lo
ss
 o
f 
Co
nf
id
en
ce
Co
ns
um
er
 C
on
fid
en
ce
Lo
si
ng
 C
on
su
m
er
C
on
fid
en
ceC
om
po
un
din
g 
Lo
ss
 
of
 C
on
fid
en
ce
C
om
m
un
ity
 R
es
ilie
nc
e
Lo
si
ng
 R
es
ilie
nc
e
C
om
po
un
di
ng
 th
e 
Lo
ss
 
of
 R
es
ilie
nc
e
Co
m
m
un
ity
 R
ec
ov
er
y
Na
tu
ra
l R
ec
ov
er
y
C
om
po
un
di
ng
Na
tu
ra
l R
ec
ov
er
y
Re
tu
rn
ing
to
 N
or
m
al
Re
co
ve
ry
 
Ra
te
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 R
es
ilie
nc
e 
Fr
om
 B
us
in
es
s 
Co
nf
id
en
ce
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 R
es
ilie
nc
e
Fr
om
 C
on
su
m
er
 C
on
fid
en
ce
Sp
ee
din
g 
R
ec
ov
er
y
Th
ro
ug
h 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
Re
sil
ien
ce
Me
dia
 In
flu
en
ce
R
ed
uc
ing
 M
ed
ia
 In
flu
en
ce
Th
ro
ug
h 
Ed
uc
at
io
n
RD
D 
Ri
sk
 E
du
ca
tio
n
R
ed
uc
ing
 M
ed
ia
 In
flu
en
ce
Th
ro
ug
h 
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r I
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r I
nv
olv
em
en
t
As
si
st
ing
 Im
pa
ct
ed
Bu
si
ne
ss
es
 th
ro
ug
h
SB
A 
D
is
as
te
r L
oa
n 
Pr
og
ra
m
s
SB
A 
Di
sa
st
er
 L
oa
ns
R
ea
ss
ur
ing
 L
oc
al 
C
on
su
m
er
s
Th
ro
ug
h 
FE
M
A 
Ef
fo
rts
FE
M
A 
Di
sa
st
er
 A
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
Lo
an
s
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r
C
oe
ff
ic
ien
t
Ed
uc
at
io
n
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
M
ed
ia
 E
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s
Ed
uc
at
ion
 
Sw
itc
h
In
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
Lo
ca
l
St
ak
eh
old
er
Sw
itc
h
Bu
si
ne
ss
 C
on
fid
en
ce
C
on
ve
rte
r
C
on
su
m
er
 C
on
fid
en
ce
 
C
on
ve
rte
r
R
es
ilie
nc
e 
C
on
ve
rte
r
In
cr
ea
sin
g
M
es
sa
ge
 f
ro
m
 T
hr
ea
t
of
 C
on
ta
m
in
at
io
n
Co
nt
am
in
at
ed
 A
re
a
C
on
ta
m
in
at
ion
C
on
ve
rte
r
Ps
yc
ho
log
ica
l E
ff
ec
t
0.
3
.3
 72 
 
Testing 
 The dynamic modeling process is incremental and iterative (Shelley, 2008).  As each 
stage of the model is created, testing occurs to identify flaws or sensitivities within the model.  
At the completion of the original complete model, the researcher performed thirty two iterations 
of refinement to create the final model presented above.  The three most useful analysis tools for 
this research effort were the sensitivity analysis, behavior anomaly, and extreme conditions tests.   
 Incremental sensitivity analysis tests were conducted for each sub-structure of the system.  
While the federal response and physical impact structures presented no significant sensitivities to 
changes in policy or numeric inputs, the psychological impact structure required the majority of 
refinements to the compounding nature of stocks feeding stocks.  This problem persisted within 
the final model when all influences between structures were created and a few behavior 
anomalies were unexpectedly produced.  Through trial and error, the anomalies were corrected 
through modifications of the conversion coefficients or embedded logic within the stock 
structures.  An example of modification within the stock structures is the change of the media 
sensationalized message from a stock than cannot present a negative value to one that is allowed 
to drop below zero.  In the initial model, this stock was not allowed to go below zero, and while 
the graphical outputs appeared acceptable for the psychological structure alone, once the 
influences from the other structures were added, there were illogical behavior patterns emerging 
within the psychological structure.  After some assessment, the stock was allowed to go below 
zero meaning that the influences from RDD risk education and stakeholder involvement could 
eliminate the media’s sensationalized coverage of the attack creating informative reporting in the 
associated media outlets.  
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Policy Result Analysis 
 User Interface 
 As noted in the literature review, there are several policy tools available to the federal 
government to counter act the negative local economic impacts of a radiological terrorist attack.  
Due to the expected small deposition and blast area from an RDD explosion in relation to the 
only recent example of a terrorist attack, September 11, 2001 the federal government may not 
respond in the same manner.  Therefore, the model presented in this research allows the user to 
test the effects of each potential policy independently. To assist in policy testing, the user 
interface, Figure 39, was created allowing the researcher to turn various policy implementations 
on and off as well as adjusting the model for existing economic conditions prior to the attack, 
such as the status of business and consumer confidence indices. 
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Figure 39: User Interface 
 
 
 Insurance Coverage 
 Following an attack, significant individual and business losses will occur if the insurance 
industry refuses coverage.  Without insurance coverage the expected behavior would yield final 
fiscal figures much higher (curve 1) than if coverage is applied (curve 2) in Figure 40.  An 
assumption of the model is that even with insurance coverage, the settlement would only cover 
80% of the total losses due to uninsured items, expenses, or lost income for either individual or 
business losses.  Consequently, the user interface is provided with an adjustment tool to change 
the expected ratio of coverage to total loss for each variable.  Adjusting the coverage ratio 
produces different losses over time as in Figure 40 where curve 3 represents only 20% coverage 
of all business losses and graph 4 represents 100% of all losses.   
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Figure 40: Comparison Results of Insurance Coverage 
 
 It is important to note that the results in Figure 40 represent only the implementation of 
insurance coverage with no federal response policies enacted to influence the system.  It is 
expected that insurance coverage would not be able to offset all fiscal impacts from the attacks, 
primarily lost revenue, if there is no recovery of the system allowing the impacted businesses to 
reopen. 
 Executive Response Policy Analysis 
 In the event of a terrorist attack it is unlikely that the executive branch agencies would 
not respond.  What are of interest to the model are the recommendations from the EPA guidance 
for response to RDD incidents and lessons learned from the Three Mile Island incident that 
might impact the economic recovery of the local area.  In the absence of fiscal offsets provided 
by legislative action, the implementation of stakeholder involvement and controlling the mass 
media’s sensationalized coverage of the attack will assist in the control of the psychological 
system.   
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 Guidance from the new EPA Protective Action Guide for response to RDD and IND 
incidents notes that, “the Federal Government is a primary funding agent for site cleanup… [and] 
assumes an incident of relatively large size.”  However, for smaller incidents this guidance may 
not be warranted as the recovery efforts may be left to the State for action (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008).  In the analysis that follows, it is assumed that the EPA will cover the 
cost of decontamination through Superfund or other means.  However, the model interface 
includes the ability to turn off that assumption implying that the decontamination costs would be 
expensed through other means.   
 The first recommendation of interest is the inclusion of local and state stakeholders such 
as Mayors, Governors, and the State EPA.   By including such influential people or agencies, 
some control over the expected misinformed and sensationalized media coverage can be created.  
The negative influence of this control measure does reduce the total economic impact; however, 
the reduction is miniscule within the first year of study.  This is due to the built-in delays in the 
model structure as expected by the researcher.  Until the sensationalized message can be 
overcome for a long enough period of time to eliminate public fear, the existence of fear will 
only continue to negatively influence recovery.  As in Figure 41, the inclusion of stakeholder 
involvement assists in bringing public fear under control, curve 2, and creates significant 
reductions from the uninfluenced behavior in curve 1. 
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Figure 41: Effects of Stakeholder Inclusion on Public Fear 
 
  
 The second recommendation taken from lessons learned after the Three Mile Island and 
Goiania, Brazil incidents is the effects of radiological risk education on the public’s fear.  In both 
examples there was a lack of public knowledge concerning general radiation risks compounded 
by ineffective communication of the actual risks involved in the responses.  If radiation risk 
education was immediately implemented in the mass media by responding federal agencies along 
with stakeholder involvement, the public fear can be brought under control relatively quickly and 
the desired outcome can be seen as a significant reduction of the total economic impact within 
the first year.  Curve three of public fear under both influences becomes zero, or no fear, at 130 
days in Figure 42.  The difference in total economic impact can be seen in Figure 43 where 
curves one and two represent no media control and stakeholder involvement, respectively, and 
curve three represents the inclusion of radiological risk education. 
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Figure 42: Influence of Education and Stakeholder Involvement on Public Fear 
 
 
Figure 43: Influence of Education and Stakeholder Involvement on Total Economic Impact 
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 Legislative Response Policy Analysis 
 As identified in the literature, the three primary tools used by the federal government that 
may be used to assist a community recover from an RDD attack are FEMA disaster assistance 
funds, SBA disaster assistance loans, and a specific stimulus package passed for revitalization of 
the local economy.  It is important to note that while FEMA and the SBA reside in the executive 
branch, the emergency funding was provided by the legislative branch in the examples 
highlighted in chapter two.  It is for this reason that these three policies are listed under the 
legislative response.   
 The following analysis is strictly of the legislative response influences on the system and 
do not include the executive response influences.  These two will be combined in the final 
section of analysis.  Of the three policy options, the first to be implemented will likely be the 
FEMA disaster assistance funding.  In Figure 44, curve one represents the uninfluenced system 
response of the total economic impact.  Curve two represents the expected impact of FEMA 
disaster assistance funds on the total economic impact.  While the FEMA efforts do diminish the 
total economic impact, alone these efforts are not enough to push the community’s economic 
recovery out of uninfluenced system behavior pattern (see Figure 45).  This is primarily due to 
FEMA’s assistance focus on individuals and their families without much response to the primary 
economic driver, business or the psychological impacts of the public fear of radiation.  In order 
to influence the psychological impact structure, more assistance will be required.   
 The addition of the SBA disaster assistance loans is the next policy likely to be 
implemented by the federal government.  Unlike the FEMA response, the SBA is focused on 
assisting businesses with their financial needs required to recover from the attack.   
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Figure 44: FEMA Disaster Assistance Influence on Total Economic Impact  
 
Figure 45: FEMA Disaster Assistance Influence on Community Recovery 
 
  
 While the SBA assistance and FEMA assistance do positively influence business and 
consumer confidence, neither addresses the public fear of radiation.  Without controlling this 
fear, it is unlikely that the economy would recover within the first year due to the unwillingness 
of consumers to return to the area fearing radiation exposure.  In Figure 46, the behavior of the 
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system from both policy implementations remains the same.  Even with the addition of a federal 
stimulus package, the community recovery will remain unchanged until the public fear of 
radiation is addressed.  This illustrates that while the total economic impact to the local 
community may be decreased significantly by the legislative branch throwing money at the 
problem (curve 3 in Figure 47) the eventual collapse of the local economy remains a significant 
possibility. 
 
Figure 46: FEMA and SBA Disaster Assistance Influence on Community Recovery 
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Figure 47: The Influence of all Legislative Responses on Community Recovery 
 
 
  
 Analysis of combining all Federal Response Tools  
 If all the federal response policies were enacted, there will be a significant negative 
influence in the total economic impact to the community that was attacked.  In Figure 49, several 
significant insights into the system are gained.  Curve one represents the baseline of total fiscal 
costs from the attack without any influences from the federal government.  Curve two represents 
the independent impact of the executive branch policy implementation on total fiscal cost, and 
curve three represents the independent impact of the legislative actions.  It is important to note 
that the control of the public fear by the stakeholders and radiological risk education from the 
onset of the response generates more reductions in total economic impact than combined effects 
of the legislative response within the year following the attack.   Combined, in curve four, all 
policy actions significantly reduce the economic impact to the local community. 
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Figure 49: The Influence of all Federal Responses on Total Economic Impact 
 
 
  
 Once the early phase of the response concludes and the local stakeholders begin to 
organize recovery efforts, a likely concern will be for the restoration of tax revenue from the area 
impacted by the attacks.  Tax revenue losses have also been a common focus found in the 
literature concerning the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Figure 49 demonstrates the effects of the 
federal response policies on tax revenue losses.  Curves one and three, doing nothing and 
legislative support only respectively, represent a continuation of tax losses over time.  The 
system does not return to full recovery, 235 days after the attack, until the executive policies 
have all been implemented.  The cumulative effect of both the executive and legislative policy 
options accelerates recovery of the tax revenue system from 235 days to 195 days, as seen in 
curve four, by simultaneously addressing public fear, business recovery needs, consumer 
recovery needs, and economic stimulation.   
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Figure 49: The Influence of all Legislative Responses on Tax Revenue Losses  
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V. Conclusion 
 The results of chapter IV present several interesting insights into the problematic 
behavior of the system.  The most notable result of the research is the importance of controlling 
public fear of radiation.  Public perception of the radiological risk following the Three Mile 
Island incident was so negative that it arguably threatened the future of the nuclear power 
industry.  In the event of a radiological terrorist attack, it is likely that such behaviors will 
resurface unless all responding entities collectively address these concerns across all forms of 
media from the onset of the attack through the final cleanup stages.  Community recovery will 
hinge on the public perceptions of risk and the influence of those perceptions on community 
attractiveness to businesses as well as the willingness of consumers to enter the area.  No matter 
what level of fiscal response the Federal Government applies to the recovery efforts, unless 
public perceptions and business incentives are addressed, the full economic recovery of the 
community will likely be difficult to achieve.   
 The model also illustrates the importance of accelerated reduction in the suspected 
contaminated area.  Based on the results, if there is a rapid decline in the size of the suspected 
contaminated area, the system will more rapidly recover.  While this may appear logical, 
responding agencies may not be concerned with the rapid reduction in the size of the cordon area 
for fear of public harm.  However, the model illustrates the important positive influence this 
action will create on the community’s recovery as well as the final summation of fiscal impact.  
An additional consideration for accelerating the reduction of the contaminated area is the 
established cleanup standard.   Using the NRC standard for radiological site restoration of 14 
mrem per year will significantly slow the recovery of the community.  Such standards have 
established regulated site decommissioning timelines that are measured in years.  If applied to 
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radiological terrorism, this standard will likely lead to economic collapse of the local economy.  
Taking this possibility into consideration, it is recommended that responding agencies and local 
stakeholders quickly establish acceptable levels of decontamination.   
  This research project has proved valuable in several manners.  It has served to 
highlight the need for dynamic modeling of complex systems that include such immeasurable, 
yet critical variables such as public fear.  It has also illustrated the importance of communication 
with the community and stakeholders to the overall recovery of the economic system.  Lastly, it 
presents an opportunity for further study in a relatively void niche of disaster response to 
radiological terrorism. 
 
  
 87 
 
VI. Recommendations for Further Research 
  
 The research model presented is does not address actual fiscal losses calculated from 
economic analysis programs such as IMPLAN©.  It is the researcher’s position that estimation of 
the final dollar figure with such programs is irrelevant and the more important question to be 
answered is how the final dollar figure can be reduced.  While the model does not produce an 
output that is representative of actual fiscal losses, it has the ability to incorporate data from 
economic input-output analysis tools.  For researchers that are interested in tying the two 
together, data from the U.S. Census Bureau and Federal, State, and Local Departments of 
Revenue show potential for creating this capability.  Ideally, geospatial information systems 
could be created that incorporate financial data for each property in the United States.  
Elementary examples of such a system can be found on county tax assessor web sites where 
users are allowed to explore data on property taxes through a map interface.  Such a system 
would allow stakeholders involved in any type of natural or man-made incident rapid assessment 
of economic impacts and therefore speed recovery decisions.   
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Appendix A: Model Equations 
 
 
Business Loss Structure 
Business_Losses(t) = Business_Losses(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Business__Losses_from_Contamination - 
Reducing_Business__Losses_from_Recovery - Revitalization_Plan__Incentives - 
Decreasing_Business_Loss_From_Insurance_Coverage) * dtINIT Business_Losses = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Business__Losses_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
OUTFLOWS: 
Reducing_Business__Losses_from_Recovery = Community_Recovery 
Revitalization_Plan__Incentives = Revitalization__Plan * 
Legislative_Financial_Backing_of_Localized_Stimulus_Plan_Switch 
Decreasing_Business_Loss_From_Insurance_Coverage = Coverage_to_Loss_Ratio * 
Insurance_Coverage_Switch 
 
Decontamination_Costs(t) = Decontamination_Costs(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Decon_Costs_from_Contamination - 
Decreasing_Cost_Through__Standards_greater_than_100_mrem - 
EPA_Coverage_of_Decontamination__Efforts) * dtINIT Decontamination_Costs = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Decon_Costs_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
OUTFLOWS: 
Decreasing_Cost_Through__Standards_greater_than_100_mrem = 
Agreement_on_Cleanup__Standards * Achieving_Agreed_upon_Cleanup_Standards_Switch 
EPA_Coverage_of_Decontamination__Efforts = EPA_Responsible_for_Decon_Costs_Switch * 
EPA_Response 
 
Contaminated_Area(t) = Contaminated_Area(t - dt) + (Increasing_Contamination - 
Reducing_Contamination - Reducing_Impacted_Area__Through_Recovery_Efforts) * dtINIT 
Contaminated_Area = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Contamination = Size_of_Weapon 
OUTFLOWS: 
Reducing_Contamination = Contaminated_Area * Reduction_Conversion 
Reducing_Impacted_Area__Through_Recovery_Efforts = Community_Recovery * 
Recovery__Conversion 
Coverage_to_Loss_Ratio = .8 
Insurance_Coverage_Switch = 1 
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Recovery__Conversion = .1 
Reduction_Conversion = .9 
Size_of_Weapon = 5 
 
Executive_Response(t) = Executive_Response(t - dt) + (Increasing_Executive__Response - 
Other_Priorities) * dtINIT Executive_Response = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Executive__Response = Public_Fear 
OUTFLOWS: 
Other_Priorities = Executive_Response * Response_Coefficient_3 
Legislative_Response(t) = Legislative_Response(t - dt) + (Increasing_Legislative_Response - 
Competing_Priorities) * dtINIT Legislative_Response = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Legislative_Response = Public_Fear 
OUTFLOWS: 
Competing_Priorities = Legislative_Response * Response_Coefficient 
Achieving_Agreed_upon_Cleanup_Standards_Switch = 0 
Agreement_on_Cleanup__Standards = Stakeholder_Involvement 
Education__Switch = 0 
EPA_Response = IF Executive_Response > 1 then 1 else 0 
EPA_Responsible_for_Decon_Costs_Switch = 0 
FEMA_Disaster_Assistance__Loans = IF Legislative_Response > 1 then 1 else 0 
Including_the_Local_Stakeholder_Switch = 0 
Legislative_Financial_Backing_of_Localized_Stimulus_Plan_Switch = 0 
Legislative_Financial_Support_for_FEMA_Loans_and_Grants__Switch = 0 
Legislative_Financial__Support_for_SBA_Programs_Switch = 0 
RDD_Risk_Education = IF Executive_Response > 1 then 1 else 0 
Response_Coefficient = .05 
Response_Coefficient_3 = .3 
Revitalization__Plan = IF Legislative_Response > 1 then 1 else 0 
SBA_Disaster_Loans = IF Legislative_Response > 1 then 1 else 0 
Stakeholder_Involvement = IF Executive_Response > 1 then 1 else 0 
 
Individual_Losses(t) = Individual_Losses(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Individual_Losses_from_Contamination - 
Decreasing_Individual_Losses_from_Insurance_Coverage - 
Decreasing_Losses_Through__Community_Recovery - FEMA_Disaster_Assistance - 
Tax_Rebates_from_Revitalization_Plan) * dtINIT Individual_Losses = 1 
INFLOWS: 
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Increasing_Individual_Losses_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
OUTFLOWS: 
Decreasing_Individual_Losses_from_Insurance_Coverage = Coverage_to_Loss_Ratio * 
Insurance_Coverage_Switch 
Decreasing_Losses_Through__Community_Recovery = Community_Recovery 
FEMA_Disaster_Assistance = FEMA_Disaster_Assistance__Loans * 
Legislative_Financial_Support_for_FEMA_Loans_and_Grants__Switch 
Tax_Rebates_from_Revitalization_Plan = Revitalization__Plan 
*Legislative_Financial_Backing_of_Localized_Stimulus_Plan_Switch 
 
Response_Costs(t) = Response_Costs(t - dt) + (Increasing_Response_Cost_from_Contamination 
- FEMA__Reimbursement) * dtINIT Response_Costs = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Response_Cost_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
OUTFLOWS: 
FEMA__Reimbursement = FEMA_Disaster_Assistance__Loans 
*FEMA_Reimbursement_of__Response_Switch 
FEMA_Reimbursement_of__Response_Switch = 1 
 
Morbidity_Cost(t) = Morbidity_Cost(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Morbidity_Costs_from_Contamination - 
FEMA_Payments_to_Families_of_the_Deceased - Insurance_Coverage) * dtINIT 
Morbidity_Cost = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Morbidity_Costs_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
OUTFLOWS: 
FEMA_Payments_to_Families_of_the_Deceased = FEMA_Disaster_Assistance__Loans * 
Legislative_Financial_Support_for_FEMA_Loans_and_Grants__Switch 
Insurance_Coverage = Coverage_to_Loss_Ratio * Insurance_Coverage_Switch 
 
Business_Confidence(t) = Business_Confidence(t - dt) + 
(Assisting_Impacted_Businesses_through_SBA_Disaster_Loan_Programs - 
Losing_Confidence_After_Attack) * dtINIT Business_Confidence = 100 
INFLOWS: 
Assisting_Impacted_Businesses_through_SBA_Disaster_Loan_Programs = 
SBA_Disaster_Loans *Effectiveness 
OUTFLOWS: 
Losing_Confidence_After_Attack = Business_Confidence * 
Compounding_the_Loss_of_Confidence *Public_Fear 
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Community_Recovery(t) = Community_Recovery(t - dt) + (Natural_Recovery + 
Speeding_Recovery_Through_Increased_Resilience - Returning_to_Normal) * dtINIT 
Community_Recovery = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Natural_Recovery = Community_Recovery * Compounding_Natural_Recovery 
Speeding_Recovery_Through_Increased_Resilience = Community_Resilience* 
Resilience__Converter 
OUTFLOWS: 
Returning_to_Normal = Recovery_Rate * Community_Recovery 
Community_Resilience(t) = Community_Resilience(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Resilience__From_Business_Confidence + 
Increasing_Resilience_From_Consumer_Confidence - Losing_Resilience) * dtINIT 
Community_Resilience = 100 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Resilience__From_Business_Confidence = Business_Confidence_Converter * 
Business_Confidence 
Increasing_Resilience_From_Consumer_Confidence = Consumer_Confidence * 
Consumer_Confidence__Converter 
OUTFLOWS: 
Losing_Resilience = Community_Resilience * Compounding_the_Loss__of_Resilience 
Consumer_Confidence(t) = Consumer_Confidence(t - dt) + 
(Reassuring_Local_Consumers_Through_FEMA_Efforts - Losing_Consumer_Confidence) * 
dtINIT Consumer_Confidence = 100 
INFLOWS: 
Reassuring_Local_Consumers_Through_FEMA_Efforts = Effectiveness * 
FEMA_Disaster_Assistance__Loans 
OUTFLOWS: 
Losing_Consumer_Confidence = Consumer_Confidence * Compounding_Loss__of_Confidence 
* Public_Fear 
Mass_Media_Sensationalized_Message(t) = Mass_Media_Sensationalized_Message(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Message_from_Threat_of_Contamination - 
Reducing_Media_Influence_Through_Education - 
Reducing_Media_Influence_Through_Stakeholder_Involvement) * dtINIT 
Mass_Media_Sensationalized_Message = 10 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Message_from_Threat_of_Contamination = Contaminated_Area * 
Contamination_Converter 
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OUTFLOWS: 
Reducing_Media_Influence_Through_Education = RDD_Risk_Education * Education__Switch 
* Education_Coefficient 
Reducing_Media_Influence_Through_Stakeholder_Involvement = Stakeholder_Involvement * 
Stakeholder_Coefficient *Including_the_Local_Stakeholder_Switch 
Public_Fear(t) = Public_Fear(t - dt) + (Natural_Fear_of_Attack + Media_Influence) * dtINIT 
Public_Fear = .1 
INFLOWS: 
Natural_Fear_of_Attack = Compounding_Fear * Public_Fear 
Media_Influence = Mass_Media_Sensationalized_Message * Media_Effectiveness 
Business_Confidence_Converter = .1 
Compounding_Fear = .01 
Compounding_Loss__of_Confidence = .1 
Compounding_Natural_Recovery = .3 
Compounding_the_Loss_of_Confidence = .1 
Compounding_the_Loss__of_Resilience = .1 
Consumer_Confidence__Converter = .1 
Contamination_Converter = .001 
Education_Coefficient = .1 
Effectiveness = .3 
Media_Effectiveness = .1 
Recovery_Rate = Community_Recovery * .1 
Resilience__Converter = .1 
Stakeholder_Coefficient = .1 
 
Reconstruction_Costs(t) = Reconstruction_Costs(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Reconstruction_Costs_from_Contamination - 
SBA_Assistance_Reducing_the_Recon_Costs) * dtINIT Reconstruction_Costs = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Reconstruction_Costs_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
 
 
OUTFLOWS: 
SBA_Assistance_Reducing_the_Recon_Costs = SBA_Disaster_Loans 
*Legislative_Financial__Support_for_SBA_Programs_Switch * Cost_Savings__Coefficient 
Cost_Savings__Coefficient = .1 
 
Tax_Revenue_Losses(t) = Tax_Revenue_Losses(t - dt) + 
(Increasing_Revenue_Losses_from_Contamination - 
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Reducing_Tax_Losses__through_Recovery_Efforts - Attracting_Business_through__Incentives) 
* dtINIT Tax_Revenue_Losses = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing_Revenue_Losses_from_Contamination = Contaminated_Area 
OUTFLOWS: 
Reducing_Tax_Losses__through_Recovery_Efforts = Community_Recovery 
Attracting_Business_through__Incentives = Revitalization__Plan * 
Legislative_Financial_Backing_of_Localized_Stimulus_Plan_Switch 
 
Total_Economic_Impact(t) = Total_Economic_Impact(t - dt) + (Increasing__Cost - 
Eventual_Realization__of_All_Costs) * dtINIT Total_Economic_Impact = 1 
INFLOWS: 
Increasing__Cost = Business_Losses + Decontamination_Costs + Individual_Losses + 
Morbidity_Cost + Reconstruction_Costs + Response_Costs+ Tax_Revenue_Losses 
OUTFLOWS: 
Eventual_Realization__of_All_Costs = Coefficient_of__Realization * Total_Economic_Impact 
Coefficient_of__Realization = .01 
 
 
 
 
  
 94 
 
Appendix II: Complete Model  
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